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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-2154 
 ___________ 
 
 RUDY STANKO, 
Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
BARACK OBAMA, Commander and Chief (Art. II, Section 2); 
WARDEN DAVID EBBERT 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 09-cv-01911) 
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, III; 
previously, Honorable James F. McClure, Jr. 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 9, 2011 
 
 Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: June 29, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Rudy Stanko, a federal prisoner, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  The District Court 
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dismissed the petition, ruling that Stanko=s claims were not appropriately brought in 
habeas because he did not challenge the fact or duration of his confinement.  Stanko 
appealed.   
 We affirmed the District Court’s order insofar as it had dismissed Stanko’s claims 
about the conditions of his confinement because, as the District Court had pointed out, 
Stanko could not present such claims in a habeas petition.  See Stanko v. Obama, 398 F. 
App’x 777, 778 (3d Cir. 2010).  However, we vacated the order to the extent that it had 
dismissed Stanko’s challenge to the validity of disciplinary proceedings that had served 
to lengthen the time that he would spend in jail.  See id. at 778-79 (citing, among other 
cases, Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-47 (1997)).  
 On remand, in accordance with our mandate, and after soliciting a response from 
the warden1
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1291.  We “exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its 
 and allowing a reply from Stanko, the District Court considered Stanko’s 
claims that sounded in habeas.   The District Court denied Stanko’s petition.  Stanko 
appeals. 
                                                 
 1The District Court dismissed President Obama as a party to this action because a 
writ of habeas corpus is properly directed to a petitioner’s custodian, see 28 U.S.C. § 
2243, in this case the warden of the facility where Stanko was confined at the time he 
filed his petition, see Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004).  (As the District 
Court also noted, Stanko’s transfer to another prison, which was not authorized pursuant 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, did not divest it (or us) of 
jurisdiction over this case.  See Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 477 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990); 
cf. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 441; Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 307 (1944). 
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findings of fact.”  See O’Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172, 173 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005); see also 
United States v. Friedland, 83 F.3d 1531, 1542 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Our review of the district 
court’s order denying . . . relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is plenary.”).  Upon review, we 
will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment because no substantial issue is 
presented on appeal.  See Local Rule 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Stanko alleged that his right to due process of law was violated in the disciplinary 
proceedings which resulted in the loss of 27 days of good conduct time.2
 In Hill, the Supreme Court further explained that to meet the minimum 
requirements of due process, the findings of the prison disciplinary board must also be 
supported by some evidence in the record.  See id.  The “some evidence” standard “does 
  Due process 
protections attach in prison disciplinary proceedings in which the loss of good-time 
credits is at stake.  See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-65 (1974).  In Wolff, the 
Supreme Court held that an inmate must receive “(1) advance written notice of the 
disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and 
correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; 
and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for 
the disciplinary action.”  Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).  
                                                 
 2He also argued that his disciplinary hearing and its result constituted an unlawful 
bill of attainder, but this argument is a non-starter.  See United States v. O’Brien, 391 
U.S. 367, 384 n.30 (1968) (defining a bill of attainder as “a legislative Act which inflicts 
punishment on named individuals or members of an easily ascertainable group without a 
judicial trial”).  Neither a disciplinary hearing nor its result was a legislative act and thus, 
neither could constitute a bill of attainder. 
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not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of 
witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.”  Id. at 455.  “[T]he relevant question is whether 
there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the 
disciplinary board.”  Id. at 455-56. 
 As the District Court explained with citations to the record, Stanko received 
advance written notice of the disciplinary charge on February 5, 2009, upon completion 
of the investigation into whether he had made threats that he would file liens against 
prison staff members.  On that same day, he received notice of his rights in disciplinary 
proceedings.  Stanko’s hearing was held on February 12, 2009.  At his hearing, where he 
was represented by an appointed staff member, Stanko had the opportunity to present 
evidence and call witnesses.  Stanko, himself, provided a statement at his hearing; he also 
presented a statement from another witness (the inmate who notarized the documents 
containing the language construed as threats).  At the conclusion of his hearing, Stanko 
was given a written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the 
disciplinary action against him.  In short, Stanko received the procedural protections set 
forth in Wolff. 
 Furthermore, there is evidence in the record to support the finding of the 
disciplinary hearing officer that Stanko had “interfered with staff in the performance of 
their duties, most like, threatening another with any other offense.”  Stanko contended 
that he was merely filing requests for administrative remedies and did not, and was not 
attempting to, file a lien against any staff members.  However, within the documents that 
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Stanko deemed requests for administrative remedies, Stanko included language that if the 
claims were not “rebutted point for point categorically within three (3) months,” they 
would become liens on all property and rights of the prison officials he named.  He stated 
that the Federal Bureau of Prisons would serve as a “surety” and pay any money due not 
covered by the liens.  At his hearing, Stanko asserted that he felt that he had “a right to 
file this with surety.”  Accordingly, there is some evidence in the record that Stanko 
interfered with staff in the performance of their duties by making threats to file liens.  As 
the District Court noted, the penalties imposed were consistent with sanctions set forth in 
the relevant regulations.  See 28 C.F.R. § 541.13.       
 Stanko made an additional argument, which the District Court misconstrued.  The 
District Court took Stanko’s statements about the prison’s non-compliance with the “24-
hour rule” to be a claim that Stanko did not receive advance notice of the charge (which 
he clearly did, see supra).  Stanko instead (or additionally) asserted that his right to due 
process was violated because he was not charged with a disciplinary infraction within 24 
hours of the time at which staff became aware of his involvement in the incident.  See 28 
C.F.R. § 541.15(a) (stating that the written charges “ordinarily” should be given to the 
inmate within that time period).  According to Stanko and at least some of the prison’s 
records, the incident occurred, or prison officials became aware of the incident, on 
December 10, 2008.  It is undisputed that Stanko did not get notice of the charge until 
February 5, 2009, one day after the conclusion of an investigation on February 4, 2009.   
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 However, even if the regulation were violated, its violation is not actionable in this 
case.  Stanko cannot show that his right to due process was violated by a possible 
technical non-compliance with the regulation where Wolff does not require issuance of 
the charge within 24 hours of the incident and where any delay did not prejudice him.  
See Wilson v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 377, 380 (3d Cir. 2003); Von Kahl v. Brennan, 855 F. 
Supp. 1413, 1421 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (explaining that “at least in situations where the 
minimal requirements of due process have been met, an inmate must show prejudice to 
the rights sought to be protected by the regulation claimed to be violated”).  Also, 
although Stanko has a liberty interest in his good time credits, he did not show that the 
regulation itself created a liberty or property interest such that its violation abridged his 
due process rights.  See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995).   
   For these reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
